{Telephone ringing}
AJ: Athens and Jerusalem Tutoring, how may I direct your call?
G: Yes, hello, this is Dr. Chen. I’d like to get tutoring for my son Jasper. He’s in college now and has an economics final coming up.
AJ: Good morning, Dr. Chen. Thank you for that information. If you don’t mind holding for one moment, I’ll connect you with one of our client service specialists who can help set that up.
C: Hi, Gordon?
G: Yes, this is Dr. Gordon Chen.
C: Oh! Hello, Dr. Chen! Sorry! Hi, this is Carl from the clients services team. How are you today?
G: Fine. Hey listen, I’m trying to get my son Jasper some help for his economics final. He isn’t thrilled about tutoring, but it’s a college class and we just want to make sure he does his best.
C: Wonderful! We’d love to help! Let’s see here…it looks like Jasper worked with us a long time ago for some middle school test prep. Is the Atherton address still accurate?
G: Yes.
C: Great. Now, as you mentioned, finals are right around the corner, so our tutors are pretty booked up. However, I see we have one econ expert, Victor Eremita, who has some openings in the afternoons. Since Jasper’s in college, he probably has a more flexible schedule?
G: I don’t know, you’ll have to ask him. Here, let me give you his number…
C: That’s okay, Dr. Chen. Thank you. It looks like we have all of the information we need to get started, so if you’d like, I can send you and Jasper an email in a few minutes connecting you with Victor, then Victor will be in touch soon after to schedule. How does that sound?
G: Wait, who is this tutor? Is he new? We don’t want someone new.
C: No, no, Victor is one of our veteran tutors. He’s been on our team many years and gets outstanding feedback from his students.
G: Okay, but has he tutored college economics before?
C: Yes, I believe he has…let’s see here…just a sec…um, yeah, it looks like he’s currently working with one college econ student. Last year he had two others and…yeah, he’s had a couple each year for the past several years.
G: Alright, we can try it, but what happens if he’s not a good fit?
C: No worries! In that case, we can try another tutor and this first session will be free of charge.
G: Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that.
C: Perfect! I’ll connect you with Victor now.
V: Are you Jasper?
J: Yes, hi.
V: Hey, Jasper, my name is Victor, and my pronouns are he/him/they. Would you like a drink or some snacks before we get started?
J: Ah, I grabbed some earlier.
V: Me too! Alright then, please follow me.
V: Here we are. You can sit on this side, and I’ll stay social-distanced over here by the whiteboard. I’m fully vaxxed and boosted, by the way. Got my bivalent booster last week, just so you know…
J: Uh, okay.
V: Right, well, let’s get started, shall we? Let’s see, my notes just say college economics, but I’m assuming it’s microeconomics? Most students take the macro course in the spring semester, but some colleges offer it in the fall, too, so…
J: Yeah, um, actually…
V: Oh, that’s fine if it’s macro! I can tutor both. Did you bring your textbook and study materials? Here, you can use this laptop if you need it.
J: No, yeah, um, err…sorry.
V: What is it?
J: It’s just…I…um…I…dang it! I told my parents I didn’t want to come here today. I don’t need help and they know it, but they’re making me come anyway just to prove some stupid point that doesn’t even matter and it just pisses me off. I should just go.
V: Oh! Hey, hang on a sec, please, wait…please, look, you’re already here, we’ve got snacks and coffee. It’s all good!
You know, economics finals can be tough, even for the best of students, but they’re also super predictable. And our finals prep program is customized to your needs, so we’ll really only spend time reviewing things that you think will be helpful.
J: No, no, no…you don’t get it! I need to go.
V: What don’t I get? Listen, I can’t stop you from leaving, but I want you to know something first, okay? The smartest students, they don’t miss points on their finals because they don’t know the material. They miss points mostly because of stress. Right? Yeah, we blame other things, we’ll say we got distracted, or managed our time poorly, or whatever, but it all boils down to stress.
Look, I can see you’ve got a lot going on right now, so let’s just take a moment to breathe…okay?
J: I’m breathing, believe me.
V: I know, I know, but let’s take a deep breath together now. Ready?
V: Ahh, that’s better. Now, I’m not great at giving advice, but I can listen without judging, so tell me, what’s going on, Jasper? What’s bothering you?
J: You wouldn’t understand.
V: Ha! Try me!
J: Really, I don’t think you’d get it, and besides, the whole thing is just absurd anyway…I can’t believe I let them talk me into this. Listen, Victor, you seem like a nice guy or…er, anyway, I don’t want to cause a scene or get into trouble or anything. Coming here was a mistake, so I’m just going to go…sorry.
V: Aw, really?! That’s it? Come on! Hey, listen, you seem to be hinting at something that I’m really not getting but am awfully curious about. I guess it’s cool if you want to just leave me hanging here, but, you know, I’m from west Texas, and I had two older brothers growing up who are very different from me, very different, okay? So I’m tougher than I look. And I can think for myself.
Now, a moment ago you said something that I didn’t understand. You said your parents are making you come here to prove some point? What did you mean by that? Prove what point?
J: It’s stupid, okay, and it doesn’t even matter. Anyway, I don’t want to be a part of it.
V: A part of what, Jasper? What are you talking about?
J: You don’t get it! Telling you is what makes me a part of it! It’s like a virus, a mind virus, okay? And whoever has it becomes a vector for transmission…but not everyone can become a vector, and some people never will…
V: This is too much! Now you have to tell me! But wait, wait, wait…I just want to make sure you know that we can discuss economics anytime, okay? Anytime you’re ready to, just say the word. But real quick, I mean, if you please…I’m dying to know more about this mind virus of yours, that is, if I can even understand it.
J: But you don’t even know what you’re asking for. You’re attracted to the mystique and the novelty, not the desire to know…
V: Can’t it be all three? Of course I want to know!
J: I mean, for its own sake…never mind.
V: Come on! Let’s test my immune system! Expose me to this mind virus of yours.
J: Very well, don’t say I didn’t warn you.
V: Consider me warned!
J: Have you ever heard of Confucius?
V: Of course.
J: Do you know anything about Confucianism?
V: Not really…I mean, I know it’s a religion from China. Same with Taoism, right?
J: Yeah, that’s right. Taoism and Confucianism are like the yin and yang of Chinese civilization. To understand the blending of Taoism and Confucianism is to understand the Chinese mindset and the Chinese way of life.
But right now, I’m highlighting Confucius and his followers for one simple reason, which is to credit them with the revitalization of the 六藝 liù yì, or Six Arts, and the corresponding division of people based on merit. This became institutionalized with the 科舉 kējǔ, or Imperial examinations, and over the last two thousand years, the classist mindset it inculcates has become ingrained in who we are as Chinese people.
And it is this—our high estimation of merit and achievement in the arts and sciences—that predisposes us to recognize and respect legitimate hierarchies of competency and authority.
V: That doesn’t sound so bad.
J: Well, it might once I slap a label on it. Suppose we were to call this aspect of Chinese culture “elitist”, and signify by this word both the idea that some individuals are better than others—that is, better morally, and not merely being more skillful in the Six Arts—we call the best of these people 士 shì, or Confucian sages, and we call their aspirants 君子 jūnzǐ, or noblemen; and let this word “elitist” further signify the idea that there is a permanent class of non-elites—the vulgar class—some of whom are not only uneducated but uneducable, for the simple reason that they have no interest in rising above their vulgar condition. We’re not talking about the entire class of 老百姓 lǎobǎixìng, or commoners, but only a subset of them, present in all societies, the 一闡提 yīchǎntí. These are the sensual hedonists incapable of belief.
At any rate, the genius of the Imperial examinations is that they were—in theory if not always in practice—open to anyone, so that even someone born into a vulgar family could rise to a much higher station if he had the talent and skill.
V: “…if he had the talent and skill,” ugh…the misogyny of the ancient world is so revolting, right? Anyway, most of what you said went way over my head, but…yeah, I guess I see what you mean about the word “elitist”, it doesn’t sound as good as something like “meritocratic”, but they mean basically the same thing. It’s funny how words are like that sometimes…
J: Yeah, I’m worthy of distinction, you’re meritocratic, they’re elitist snobs. Russell’s conjugation…
V: What?
J: It doesn’t matter. Anyway, the point I’m trying to make is this: just as the Trivium and Quadrivium served as the basis of distinction in the West—propelling the ancient cultures of Athens and Jerusalem securely into the future—in the East, thanks to the Confucians and their revitalization of the Six Arts, Chinese civilization has been the dominant civilization in East Asia for more than two thousand years. But our civilization—like that of the Greeks and Hebrews, among others—is much, much older than that! Over 5,000 years!
You see, we Chinese people are very proud of our culture, and we don’t mind letting other people know. We are delighted when foreigners try to learn our language and way of life and see this as a mark of distinction, not as “cultural appropriation” like the 白左 báizuǒ suppose.
And, if we’re giving an honest assessment, we cannot overlook the many, probably very many, maybe tens of millions of ignorant Chinese peasants who put on airs about how they’re somehow better than all other foreigners simply because they’re Chinese. Every society has people of this sort, who have nothing to boast of but their accidental physical traits and the achievements of others. When it suits them, the Chinese Communist Party exploits these people for the glory of their ethno-nationalist State, but in Hong Kong we pity them. At least civilized people do…
V: Okay, yeah, I get it, Chinese people value achievement and success, this makes them elitist in a way, and they’re proud of their culture. What’s the big deal?
J: One of the big deals is that we’re not ashamed of it, and we’re not going to cower or run and hide when you call us “elitist”. We’ll wear this label proudly. We’re elitist because we know that we’re better.
And don’t misunderstand me, it’s not only the Chinese that are elitist. Every culture has an elite class, and the general rule seems to be that the older the culture, the higher the standards of virtue and excellence. And, let’s be clear, this class of elites is very much distinct from the supposed “elites” in the wealthy class— especially the 土豪 tǔháo, or nouveau riche—people who somehow managed to strike it rich but have no education and, hence, no class at all. These are people for whom the virtue of saints is as abstract a concept as the flight of birds.
V: But isn’t everyone unique and special in some way, or has some excellence or virtue that is peculiar to them and that sets them apart from others?
J: That’s what we’ve been taught to believe, but it’s doubtful. We’re talking about real virtue and excellence here. Virtue and excellence in morality, in character— people like Marcus Aurelius and Confucius, or maybe even Socrates and Plato if we set our sights high enough.
And don’t misunderstand me, this is not some primitive amour de soi brutish virtue, nor the phony amour-propre virtue of the bourgeoise. Machiavelli and his disciples are not wrong they observe that a man’s virtues are, more often than not, only vices disguised. We Chinese long ago noted the potential for contradiction here. Our sacred books—the 易經 I Ching and the 道德經 Tao Te Ching, for example—teach us that the highest virtue—true holiness—can only be cultivated through service to others. On the other hand, our ancient political treatises—for example, the 商君書 Book of Lord Shang or the 韩非子 Han Feizi—teach us that outstanding men are, as a general rule, despised the world over. Whether this is due to fear, envy, or shame, is anybody’s guess…probably all three. Anyway, this is why, according to this Legalist realpolitik perspective, the vulgar must be ruled by a strict and sometimes brutal adherence to a law imposed on them by their betters.
I should mention that the Greeks, too, recognized this tension long ago, and one need only consult Aristotle’s Politics for a lesson on the political life of the ancient world, to say nothing of its value as a textbook on political theory. At any rate, both in China and in the West, the conclusion seems to be this: Societies will be ruled by inferior men so long as those most fit to rule have better things to do; and, as a corollary, those most fit to rule will only submit to taking over rulership when they deem the life of a private citizen to be worse than the life of a statesman. And, let’s be honest, a society will need to have degraded to a very low state in order to get virtuous people to wade into the swamp of political life.
V: Gosh, when you put it in those terms, all of this sounds super pretentious and, to be honest, a little sexist and offensive. But really you said too much for me to process. Would you mind summarizing your basic point?
J: Yeah, sorry, I ramble sometimes. Basically, I’m trying to say that there are people out there in the world—real people of flesh and blood, Chinese, American, Indian, Egyptian, people from every nation—who believe in the existence of real virtue and excellence. They embody it in their daily lives, and some who have been at it for decades are very skilled. The masses tend to despise these people, either out of shame or envy or fear, and this is why those blessed with such virtue do not concern themselves with the opinions of the vulgar, but only value the perspective of others like themselves.
V: So, if I understand you correctly, a nicer way to say this would be that people of notable talent—your so-called “elites”—only value the recognition of other talented people, since they are the only ones qualified to judge?
J: That’s right. Now, consider what follows. When we’re talking about ping pong, chess, or Brazilian jiujitsu—or even team sports like soccer or basketball—we don’t have any problem admitting that some people are better than others. We even have tryouts to see who can make the team and tournaments to see who’s best. And when it comes to things like removing a brain tumor or piloting an airplane, we trust that the people in these and similar professions have the necessary skills—some more so than others to be sure—but all will be at least minimally competent to perform their respective job. And, if it turns out that they’re incompetent, and if people are harmed by this incompetence, well, then they can be held accountable, at least in theory…the system is imperfect.
V: Right, we expect professionals to be able to do their jobs. This isn’t controversial.
J: Not yet, but think about the example of piloting an airplane. Even the biggest airplanes can at most carry a few hundred people, and to fly them we make pilots go through years of training and apprenticeship, take regular examinations to make sure they haven’t forgotten anything and are keeping up with the latest developments in the world of piloting, submit to background checks, drug screenings, psychological evaluations, and so on, just to operate a vehicle that carries a few hundred people through the air. Are you following me?
V: Yes.
J: Good. Now consider as well the fact that the passengers are not the ones evaluating the competency of the pilots. The entire certification process happens behind the scenes, so to speak, although still very much in public view. Again, the pilots take classes, tests, etc. and this is all out in the open, it’s just happening behind the scenes, and long before any passenger steps foot on the airplane.
V: Okay.
J: Right, so far this is all very normal. But this next point is where the Chinese person, or really anyone from the ancient world, differs from the modern Westerner, especially the 白左 bái zuǒ,.
V: Bi-what?
J: 白左 Bái zuǒ. White left, but liberals more generally, and especially the followers of woke ideology.
V: Isn’t that racist?
J: To say “white left” is racist? Have you heard of Thomas Sowell’s book “Black Rednecks and White Liberals”? Is that title racist, too?
V: I’ve never heard of it, no, but you are grouping people together based on race and political preference.
J: So?
V: I don’t know, it just feels like a slippery slope, that’s all.
J: Right, well, when it comes to acting rationally—that is, self-interestedly—Chinese people tend to rely more on reason than emotions, and to our way of thinking, governing a state is a far more important and consequential activity than flying an airplane.
So we want to make sure that the people making political decisions are not only competent at statecraft, but also, if possible, that they are honest, loyal, good-tempered, and just. In short, we want our rulers to be true lovers of humanity, people who have acquired virtue and excellence in the service of others.
And it is not only the elites who prefer wise and benevolent rulers. The vulgar, too— once they overlook their fear, envy and shame—recognize that their own prosperity is tied to good governance.
V: I see the problem now…this sounds very undemocratic.
J: Yes, if we are to be consistent in our application of Confucian ethics, we must extend this elitist mindset to the skill of wielding political power, that is, to the art of statecraft. When we do this, we see that being ruled by people of inferior character and distinction can only accidentally lead to good outcomes. And this is not because inferior rulers are self-interested…no, no, actually, the best rulers are the most self-interested, because they’re the most rational.
Indeed, the greatest statesmen are those who tie their own private self-interest to the interest of the state, that is, they realize that they benefit most when the interests of the people are attended to. And the worst statesmen do the reverse, that is, they become parasites of the state, looking only for personal advantage and caring nothing for the people. This is well-known and obvious in Chinese history, one need only study our 朝代循環 cháodài xúnhuán, or dynasty cycle, to see the point I’m making.
But, for a more recent example, you could compare the character of the founders of the American Republic with the character of the founders of the French Republic. Hannah Arendt’s book On Revolutions delves more into this comparison, if you’re interested.
V: Yeah, okay, maybe I’ll check it out. But, anyway, weren’t the American founders all basically slave owners? So how good could their character have been?
J: Maybe some of them were…so what? Maybe some people have a slavish nature and are better off as the slaves or serfs of a benevolent master than if they were left to fend for themselves…
V: What!?
J: Maybe this sounds terrible to modern ears, but we Chinese have a proverb, 忠言逆耳 zhōng yán nì ěr, which means something like: truth is a bitter pill. And, truth be told, our reasons are really no different than Aristotle’s. Do you remember, in his Politics and elsewhere, when he distinguishes between natural slaves and freemen?
V: Ah…nope.
J: I don’t suppose it matters, but his basic point is that for certain kinds of people, a segment of the vulgar I talked about earlier, the 一闡提 yīchǎntí…
V: And who are they again?
J: It’s a loan word, from the Sanskrit icchantika, which means something like an incorrigible hedonist. Every society has them, some more than others. In Chinese we say 生盲一闡提 shēngmáng yīchǎntí, an incorrigible hedonist blind from birth, signifying that this hedonist condition is tied to a person’s karma, and we shouldn’t expect them to improve. Such people are incapable of belief, they are uneducable, and unable to rise above their condition.
Anyway, this is just my Chinese way of understanding Aristotle’s distinction between natural slaves and freemen. But I have a copy of his complete works right here, see for yourself what he says in Politics:
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects—for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for that work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work[ing relationship]); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering from the subject.
We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition.
At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always harmful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts.
And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens—that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right. (1254a16-1255a2)
J: And, tying this to hedonism, in the Nicomachean Ethics we find:
For, it would seem, people quite reasonably reach their conception of the good, i.e., of happiness, from the lives they lead; for there are roughly three most favored lives: the lives of gratification, of political activity, and, third, of study.
The many, the most vulgar, would seem to conceive the good and happiness as pleasure, and hence they also like the life of gratification. In this they appear completely slavish, since the life they decide on is a life for grazing animals. (1095b13)
J: And:
The pleasures that concern temperance and intemperance are those that are shared with the other animals, and so appear slavish and bestial. These pleasures are touch and taste. (1118a25)
J: You see?
V: See what?
J: Slavish people—yesterday, today, and tomorrow, in China, Greece, the world over—are hedonists. They only care about the satisfaction of their non-rational, sensual desires, and are content living this way, disinclined to change. In the ancient world, this narrow range of concerns made slavish people unfit for anything but the most menial labor, but according the modern ethos, I suppose one could have a slavish nature and become a celebrated politician or an educator of children.
When considering the modern slave, especially the modern Western slave, we must recognize that he or she—or zhe or ae or they or it—is a product of affluence and state-sponsored propaganda—and if we’re talking about our youngest generations, we have to include social media—so that there will be varying degrees of slavishness, and a person’s brand of slavery will be tied to their preferences. What was it Aldous Huxley said? Here, I have it on my phone:
The perfect dictatorship would have the appearance of a democracy, but would basically be a prison without walls in which the prisoners would not even dream of escaping. It would essentially be a system of slavery where, through consumption and entertainment, the slaves would love their servitudes.
J: From this perspective, we must distinguish between the slavish politician or educator, who, in spite of their skeptical nihilism—or, rather, because of cowardice and vanity—forgo suicide and participate in society in order to satisfy their hedonistic desires; we must distinguish between these types of slaves, and the slavish welfare queen, for example—who, let’s be honest, is an anomaly of history certain to go extinct—whose entire hedonistic existence is maintained through government wealth transfers.
V: Welfare queen!? Come on! How about “intergenerational trauma victim of a white supremacist culture who is entitled to social welfare programs”, or “product of a systemically racist society that values profits over people”, or a thousand other things that actually describe her true condition?
J: Well, first of all, I said “welfare queen”, I didn’t specify a race, you just assumed our queen was non-white. Presumptuous conclusions of this kind can get us into trouble.
Anyway, at least my title has some semblance of dignity, however ironic, whereas descriptions such as yours seem to deny people, or at least undersell them on the idea that they have individual autonomy, thereby robbing them of agency by assuming that they are just products of their environment.
Virtuous traits such as courage, moderation, self-respect, personal responsibility, all become unobtainable when you see yourself as a perpetual victim. It also assumes that all people of a particular social group are—for all practical purposes—the same, which, again, is a presumption that quickly leads to very dark places.
But this is all a digression, the point of which is to say that even if some of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic owned slaves, this would tell us nothing of their character if we conceive of slavery as the natural condition of certain kinds of people, namely incorrigible hedonists.
V: But even if you granted that certain kinds of people have a slavish nature, you have to admit that some people who are born slaves—people like Fredrick Douglass, for example—have the opposite of a slavish nature.
J: Although that’s true enough, it’s beside the point, and anyway Aristotle accounts for them when he says:
Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens—that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen.
J: And, later on, in Politics:
…the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention—the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force; and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger).
If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:
"Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods?"
What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true. (Bekker #)
J: You see? People like Fredrick Douglass would belong to this class, but, again, all this seems to be going in a direction that is irrelevant to my point.
V: Okay, and what is your point?
J: I guess I’m trying to make several points—consider them premises, if you will—that are all lending support to a conclusion we’ll be arriving at soon. The basic point of this digression was to establish that humans form a natural hierarchy whose basic division is between slaves and non-slaves. Modern slaves are slaves to their basest desires, that is, they are content hedonists.
V: What’s so bad about hedonism anyway? A life of pleasure actually sounds kinda nice.
J: I’m not so sure. In Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, Socrates asks, “…whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching?” In the Republic, he compares the life spent in pursuit of bodily pleasure to that of one spent filling a vessel that is full of holes. And, in the Philebus, he suggests that a life of true fulfillment and happiness is one in which the pleasures of the body are mixed with, but subordinate to, the pursuit of knowledge of the Good, or the contemplation of the Good, however you want to think about it.
V: “However I want to think about it”? Ha! That’s going to be a problem when phrases like “knowledge of the Good” and “contemplation of the Good” are essentially meaningless to me. I’m afraid I don’t know what Plato’s “Good” is.
J: Fair enough. Allegories and myths are pretty much all you’ll get from him anyhow…the Good is like the Sun, illuminating the true nature of things, etc. And Aristotle’s—or Confucius’ for that matter—injunction to follow the Golden Mean isn’t much better.
V: What’s that?
J: Both Confucius and Aristotle—and the Buddha, among others—taught that people should, in their temperaments and in their actions, seek the 中庸 zhōngyōng, Golden Mean, or Middle Way—between excess and deficiency. But they never specify exactly what this “mean” is in every case. For example, between pride and humility we find modesty, but it’s up to us to decide what’s what in a given situation.
Anyway, it’s a well-known ethical system from the ancient world, and yet another overlap between Greek and Chinese philosophy.
V: What was the other one again?
J: Actually there are several others, but the one I mentioned a moment ago is the division of people into specific, merit-based classes, with the 士 shì—the sages—at the top; below them the 君子 jūnzǐ—or nobility; then the 老百姓 lǎobǎixìng—or commoners; and, at the bottom, the 一闡提 yīchǎntí, the incorrigible hedonists. This roughly follows Plato’s myth of the metals, where people are born with a Gold, Silver, Bronze, or Iron soul.
Another addresses your problem earlier, and is essentially the ancient world’s answer to skeptical relativism.
V: What’s that?
J: Like all answers to skepticism, we’re talking about ontological realism rooted in the analysis of language. In China we call it 正名 zhèngmíng, or the rectification of names. In the Analects of Confucius we find:
A superior man, in regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve. If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music do not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect. (Book XIII, Chapter 3, verses 4–7)
J: Through the lens of history, we can see that the Confucians were trying to strike a balance between the authoritarian despotism of the Legalists and the laissez-faire individualism of the Taoists. Over time, this ontological realist position, with its emphasis on linguistic formalism, evolved into the establishment of legal codes that appealed to objective standards, which, eventually, led to the Imperial examination system.
I should add that in India—around the same time—first Panini, then Patanjali and the Nyaya school, and over in Greece Plato, then Aristotle, basically accomplished the same thing.
V: I’m afraid I’ve lost you again…and I feel like you’re just name dropping in order to impress me for some reason. Can you say that again? Who did what?
J: Name dropping, huh? Is that what I’m doing? To impress who…you? Are you someone whose praise is often sought?
V: No.
J: Then what makes you think I’m seeking it?
V: I…I don’t know.
J: Well, don’t flatter yourself. Besides, what matters are the ideas, not their source. I’m presenting them to you in this way to demonstrate that the ideas are the same, across time and space and culture. That is, they are universal.
V: Oh? Is that right?
J: I sure hope so, and so should you, because we’re talking about things like formal standards for the definition of words, rules for logical demonstration and the presentation of facts and evidence, cataloging syllogisms and logical fallacies, taxonomy—basically the entire foundation and framework for our modern systems of jurisprudence and natural science.
V: Alright, but I guess I’m a little confused. I mean, didn’t someone write a book a while back, something about scientific revolutions? I don’t remember exactly, but one of my professors said something about this book that changed the way we think about science…like when we go from geocentrism to heliocentrism, or from Newton to Einstein, and our whole worldview needs to shift to the updated model. That's it! I remember now. He called it a paradigm shift.
And what these paradigm shifts show is that science is not a fixed or static thing, but something dynamic that changes over time. Therefore, scientific truths change over time, too. So, I understand that these people you mentioned—Confucius, Aristotle, and so on—set up the foundations for things like jurisprudence and natural science, but, it’s 2022, haven’t we moved past that? Aren’t we in the age of “post truth”?
J: You must be referring to Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
V: Right, that’s it!
J: Yeah, this book is one of the crowning achievements of Marxist polylogism.
V: Polyla…what?
J: Polylogism. It’s a notion derived from Hegel’s historicism, but in Marx’s gifted hands it spread as the idea that human reason is not universal but rather differs based on time, place, culture, race, and, most importantly, economic class. This view implies that there are different “logics” based on one’s historical circumstances, race, class, etc. For example, Marx distinguishes between capitalist logic and proletarian logic, but, in the language of today, our postmodern relativists distinguish between “my truth” or “my lived experience” and everyone else’s, as though there were not some common human experience through which all humans, qua humans, can understand one another and that serves as the basis of genuine empathy, an empathy that transcends the accidental qualities of time, space, culture, race, class, etc.
This cloaking of epistemological relativism in modern garb is Marx’s great contribution to the history of philosophy. And it made its way to Kuhn’s book mainly through the work of Karl Popper.
V: Who is he?
J: He was an Austrian philosopher known for his work in the philosophy of science. Taking his cues from Hume’s work on induction, Popper concluded that the “verification” of scientific “truth” was impossible, and the best we can do is “falsify” a given scientific hypothesis.
V: What does that mean?
J: For example, the supposed “verification” of Einstein’s theory of special relativity by Michaelson and Morely was, according to this view, only the “falsification” of the aether theory, and nothing more. It cannot be a “verification” of Einstein’s theory because, sometime in the future, we—in all probability—will make another discovery that in some way falsifies the theory of special relativity. In other words, according to this view, all scientific truths are merely provisional. They are at most stopgaps along a never-ending road of progressively more accurate knowledge.
V: Is there something wrong with this view?
J: Not if we ignore Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and synthetic a priori knowledge. Or, stated differently, only if we have an aversion to scientific irrationalism.
V: What do you mean?
J: Only that Hume’s radical skepticism, logically sound though it may be, is nevertheless rooted in irrationality and should be kept as far away from science as possible.
V: I don’t get it.
J: Well, for a technical explanation—and by “technical” I mean in the language of symbolic logic—I would refer you to David Stove’s book, Probability and Hume’s Inductive Skepticism. For a more accessible explanation, you can check out his book Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult.
V: Can you give me the cliff notes version?
J: I just did. The cliff notes version is just that: radical skepticism is fundamentally irrational. Full stop.
V: So what? Does everything have to be rational?
J: What a fatuous question! Of course not. Poetry, music, dancing…there are all sorts of irrational delights. But removing brain tumors, piloting airplanes, governing states, and for science generally, these activities—especially if they’re to be performed skillfully—require not skepticism but an absolute commitment to reason as the arbiter of whatever disputes arise, be they theoretical or practical.
Now, at the end of this digression we arrive back where we started, with the establishment of formal standards for all the things I mentioned before, that form the foundation and framework for our modern systems of jurisprudence and natural science.
Jurisprudence is the arbitration of disputes pertaining to social relations; natural science is the arbitration of disputes pertaining to our shared empirical reality. Skill in both practical and theoretical reason, cultivated so that one is capable of making wise decisions based on correct discernment, is the kind of virtue and excellence that makes the 士 shì and 君子 jūnzǐ—sages and noblemen—fit to be rulers and the 老百姓 lǎobǎixìng and 一闡提 yīchǎntí—commoners and incorrigible hedonists—fit to be subjects and, in some cases, even slaves—of the Huxley type I mentioned before.
V: What type was that again?
J: Those who are slaves to the hedonism of consumption and entertainment. These types of people have no business in politics. They have no business educating children. Aristotle was right. They are fit for manual labor and not much else.
V: That sounds terrible!
J: Well, we’re living the alternative! A society turned on its head, where mediocrity is elevated to high places in every discipline, the political leaders are buffoons, moral relativism is the guiding ethos, and what are the results? Record poverty, record homelessness, record inflation, to say nothing of the recent lockdowns of healthy populations, or the proclaiming of certain jobs “essential” and others “non-essential”, or private companies going along with coercive government “mandates” of experimental gene-therapies—but just for the plebs and of course exempting “elites” like Mark Zuckerberg, as we learn from that leaked private video of a Facebook meeting—all the while alternative treatments like Ivermectin were being suppressed and the doctors promoting them were slandered and censored by other “elites” like Francis Collins and Lord Fauci (I’m of course talking about their email exchange to engineer a “devastating takedown” of the Great Barrington Declaration)—oh, and let’s not forget the record-low military recruitment from a dumbed-down and drugged-up population taught to hate their country, nor the invasion of “migrants” who, if they’re not bone-fide infiltrators from a foreign intelligence service or one of the countless victims of child trafficking, will in all likelihood be a segment of the uneducated masses, that is, people susceptible to the indoctrination into slavish hedonism I mentioned before. I could go on and on. My point is that maybe, just maybe, America would be in a different position if her political leaders were required to demonstrate their wisdom and benevolence before assuming office.
V: Whoa, you said a lot there, Jasper, and I probably disagree with all of it in some way or another, which isn’t to say that I’m right and you’re wrong, but rather that these are debatable issues. But, seriously though, politicians demonstrating wisdom? Isn’t this asking a bit much? It sounds rather Utopian to me.
J: Utopian, yes, and therefore impractical. So what can be done?
V: How would I know?
J: It’s a tough nut to crack, that’s for sure. My friends and colleagues have some ideas, but it’s a work in progress.
V: Ideas like what?
J: To give you a sense, it involves things like drafting political candidates at every level—vetted people who meet certain criteria—then organizing and fundraising for their campaigns. I said every level, but the focus now is the local level—specifically school boards—in order to reform the curricula and generate awareness of the issues that the government-media cartel ignores or censors. We’re also strongly advocating for amending the federal Constitution, by invocation of Article 5 if necessary.
V: To what end?
J: There are various proposals out there, some more modest than others, but all involve things like term-limits and the decentralization of federal power. In general, our working group is heeding the advice of Machiavelli in the opening of the third book of his Discourses of Livy.
V: What’s that?
J: Here, I’ll quote him:
It is a very true thing that all worldly things have a limit to their life; but generally those go the whole course that is ordered for them by heaven, that do not disorder their body but keep it ordered so that either it does not alter or, if it alters, it is for its safety and not to its harm. Because I am speaking of mixed bodies, such as republics and sects, I say that those alterations are for safety that lead them back toward their beginnings. So those are better ordered and have longer life that by means of their orders can often be renewed or indeed that through some accident outside the said order come to the said renewal. And it is a thing clearer than light that these bodies do not last if they do not renew themselves.
J: Which is to say, we are advocating for political revival—in other words, a reexamination of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers and a return to the principles of liberty and the limitations on federal power debated throughout those books. But it’s all too much to cover right now. A general picture of the kind of thing we’re aiming at can be gleaned by considering a few of the propositions that James Burnham offers us in his book Suicide of the West. In that book, Burnham offers a list of propositions that he believes are free of ideological commitments, and numbers 11 through 15 on that list get to the gist of it. They read as follows:
11. Whether or not there is any truth that is both objective and capable of being known to be so, no society can preserve constitutional government or even prevent dissolution unless in practice it holds certain truths to be, if not literally self-evident, then at any rate unalterable for it, and not subject to the changing will of the popular majority or of any other human sovereign.
12. A number of principles have been appealed to as the legitimate basis of government, and most of these have been associated in the course of time with bad, indifferent and moderately good government. Government resting on unqualified universal franchise—especially where the electorate includes sizable proportions of uneducated or propertyless persons, or cohesive sub- groups—tends to degenerate into semi-anarchy or into forms of despotism (Caesarism, Bonapartism) that manipulate the democratic formula for anti-democratic ends.
13. In their existential reality, human beings differ so widely that their natural and prudent political ordering is into units more limited and varied than a world state. A world state having no roots in human memory, feeling and custom, would inevitably be abstract and arbitrary, thus despotic, in the foreseeable future, if it could conceivably be brought into being. Though modern conditions make desirable more international cooperation than in the past, we should be cautious in relation to internationalizing institutions, especially when these usurp functions heretofore performed by more parochial bodies.
14. It is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate all inequalities among human beings. Although it is charitable and prudent to take reasonable measures to temper the extremes of inequality, the obsessive attempt to eliminate inequalities by social reforms and sanctions provokes bitterness and disorder, and can at most only substitute new inequalities for the old.
15. It is impossible and undesirable to eliminate hierarchies and distinctions among human beings. A large number of distinctions and groupings, rational and non-rational, contributes to the variety and richness of civilization, and should be welcomed, except where some gross and remediable cruelty or inequity is involved.
J: Well, what do you think of this list?
V: I don’t know, I’d have to consider it more.
J: Right, well: it’s a lot to consider! Anyway, we’re running low on time here, so should we switch to economics?
V: Ha! Yes, of course, I almost forgot! How funny…yes, please, let’s take a look at what you have. Did you bring your textbook?
J: Yes, here it is.
V: Human Action: A Treatise on Economics by Ludwig von Mises? What’s this?
J: My textbook.
V: For what class?
J: Austrian Economics I.
V: At what university?
J: Hillsdale College. I’m in my last year there. Anyway, for my economics course, there is this final paper due next week. It’s mostly done, but my parents wanted me to have a professional tutor take a look at it.
V: Well, I guess you’re lucky I’m also an English tutor!
J: Yeah, let’s hope so! Here’s the assignment I chose:
Using your lecture notes and other course materials, explain, as succinctly as possible and in your own words, Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s contention that the work of Ludwig von Mises proves the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge of economic phenomena.
V: Sorry, what!?
J: What…what?
V: What are you talking about?! What is this question even asking?
J: It’s asking me to explain why Hoppe thinks that Mises’ grand achievement is proving the existence of true, synthetic a priori knowledge in economics.
V: Then I’m sorry, Jasper, I don’t know if I can help you.
J: What do you mean?
V: I mean, this doesn’t sound like economics to me.
J: What do you mean?
V: I mean, this is a question for a philosophy class.
J: Yes, well, have you read Mises’ book?
V: No.
J: Then you’re probably right and won’t be of much help to me, but I assure you, the book is about economics. What passes for economics today is little more than econometrics, the rudiments of which can be taught to a smart sixth grader.
Classical economics—knowledge of which is essential for good governance—is a more serious subject, but like any science, it begins with certain axioms and proceeds with various deductions. It’s not so difficult to grasp either, once you understand logic. A bit of historical knowledge helps, too. Still, as with any subject, for some it takes longer than others.
V: Of course.
J: Well, anyway, can you at least read my paper and let me know if you notice any glaring mistakes?
V: I’ll try.
J: Cool, here it is:
We will begin with a brief review of Kantian epistemology.
Kant divides human knowledge into two basic categories according to the following criteria:
1) a priori — innate ideas, not based on experience
2) a posteriori — empirical facts, based on experience
He then distinguishes between two types of statements:
1) analytic — subject and predicate contain the same information (e.g. all bachelors are unmarried), therefore true by definition
2) synthetic — predicate contains information not contained in the subject (e.g. America has bachelors), therefore only true if verified by experience
With this framework, Kant establishes the following four categories of knowledge:
1) analytic a posteriori
2) synthetic a posteriori
3) analytic a priori
4) synthetic a priori
Let us now consider whether there are or could be statements that are both true and non-trivial for each of these categories.
1) analytic a posteriori: following Kripke, we cite examples like “Water is H2O” that are both true and non-trivial
2) synthetic a posteriori: “America has bachelors” could be both true and non-trivial
3) analytic a priori: “All bachelors are unmarried” is true but trivial
4) synthetic a priori: following Kant, we cite examples like Euclid’s fifth postulate (Playfair’s reformulation) : “In a plane, given a line and a point not on it, at most one line parallel to the given line can be drawn through the point” that are both true and non-trivial
The existence of synthetic a priori knowledge means that humans can have true and non-trivial knowledge of the world, without relying on prior experience. Kant’s great insight, and his answer to Hume’s radical skepticism, establishes the epistemological basis for theoretical knowledge in all sciences henceforth. Scientific inquiry may therefore proceed confidently and in spite of all skeptical objections.
With this background in mind, we now want to consider whether or not economics is a science in which synthetic a priori knowledge is possible.
According to economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe, the simple proposition “Humans act” suffices as proof of a true synthetic a priori statement, since any attempt to disprove the axiom serves as a proof of its axiomatic validity (p. 22). From this axiom—what he calls the “action axiom”—all of the laws of classical economics can be deduced, as Mises’ work shows: the laws of exchange, the law of diminishing marginal utility, the Ricardian law of association, the law of price controls, and the quantity theory of money (p. 25).
Hoppe contends that the praxeological method, as developed and applied by Ludwig von Mises in his book Human Action, is a landmark achievement in economics that establishes its legitimacy as an aprioristic science, like physics or chemistry.
The fact that his work continues to be ignored and overshadowed by the Fabian Socialism of Keynes and his descendents is one of the great tragedies of human history.
J: Well, what do you think?
V: I…uh, I don’t know what to say. I mean, it’s clear and concise and it seems to answer the prompt, but its structure is a bit odd.
J: Yeah, I am trying to say as much as I can in as few words as possible, using Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as my inspiration.
V: Yeah, I noticed, not about Vitenshitine, or whatever, but the other thing...being concise, I mean, it’s a good approach if you have a target audience that you know can understand you. I’m afraid that’s not me…
J: What wasn’t clear?
V: Just the whole thing. It all feels very strange and foreign. I’m sorry I couldn’t be of more help to you, Jasper.
J: Yeah, that’s a bummer. Well, I guess I’ll be on my way then.
V: Hey, wait just a second, you didn’t answer my question from before.
J: What question?
V: What did you mean when you said that your parents were trying to prove some point by having you come here?
J: Oh, yeah, it’s nothing, really, they just knew that you wouldn’t be able to help...
V: Huh?
J: You see, my dad grew up in Hong Kong, under the tutelage of Jimmy Lai. Do you know who he is?
V: Not a clue.
J: Look him up. Anyway, let’s just say that for men like them, entrepreneurialism and governance by the rule of law are their blood and bones. But they’re Chinese, too, and raised in the traditional way, according to Confucian ethics, like we discussed earlier. So they’re elites.
V: I see…
J: Yes, well, Jimmy Lai is now in a Communist slave labor camp, probably making a pair of Nike shoes for Lebron James. But my father is down the street in our Atherton home, safe from the Communists, for now, but unable to return to Hong Kong.
V: Why is that?
J: Because of his association with people like Jimmy Lai and Miles Guo. It doesn’t matter, the point is he can’t go back. So now he’s using his resources to defeat Chinese Communism in the U.S.
V: What do you mean?
J: Well, I’ll be brief because our time is almost up and I have to run to another meeting, but basically the Chinese Communist Party has been riding on the coattails of the Fabian Socialists like Keynes and the “Long March Through the Institutions” types like Gramsci, Dutschke, and Marcuse. What I mean is they’ve exploited the vulnerabilities of the open society to the fullest.
V: How so?
J: By infiltrating America’s institutions to spread pro-Communist ideology. Working with the subversion model they inherited from the Soviets, outlined in the work of defector Yuri Bezmenov, they’ve been implementing this strategy, called 超限戰 chāo xiàn zhàn, or Unrestricted Warfare, for over two decades.
There’s so much more to say, especially about Song Hongbing’s bestseller 貨幣戰爭 huòbì zhànzhēng, or Currency Wars, which discusses the rise of the Rothschild banking dynasty and their role in international affairs ever since. We’d have to compare that to G. Edward Griffin’s The Creature from Jekyll Island and Quigley’s Tragedy and Hope.
V: Yeah, that sounds fascinating. I wish we had more time to discuss.
J: Me too! Well, it was nice meeting you, Victor. Have a wonderful rest of your day. Oh, and get back to me about your immunity!!